Rava said: The prohibition can be derived in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yona, as Rabbi Yona says: It is derived from the verse: ''But in the place that the Lord will choose in one of your tribes, there you shall offer up your burnt offerings and there you shall do all that I command you'' (Deuteronomy 12:14), through the juxtaposition of the word ''there'' in the first part of the verse to the word ''there'' in the second part of the verse. This serves to juxtapose the offering up, mentioned in the first part, to the sacrifice of an offering, mentioned in the second part, which includes slaughtering it. Accordingly, it teaches that just as there, with regard to offering up, the Torah did not prescribe punishment unless it also prohibited it, so too here, with regard to slaughtering, the Torah did not prescribe punishment unless it also prohibited it. Therefore, even though the Torah does not explicitly state the prohibition, it is evident that it is prohibited.

§ The Gemara (106a) states that the source for the liability for offering up outside the Temple is the verse: ''Any man…that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice, and he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice it to the Lord, and that man shall be cut off from his people'' (Leviticus 17:8–9). The Gemara asks: We have found that one is liable only for offerings that are fit to be burned inside the Temple courtyard, having been appropriately slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, which one then offered up outside the courtyard. The verse states: ''He will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,'' which indicates that they were fit to be brought to the Temple. From where is it derived that one is also liable with regard to offerings that are unfit and are to be burned outside the Temple as they were unlawfully slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, that one then offered up outside?

Rav Kahana said: The beginning of that verse states: ''And to them [va’alehem] you shall say'' (Leviticus 17:8). The term ''alehem,'' to them, written with the letter alef, is phonetically similar to the term alehem, about them, written with the letter ayin. Therefore, the verse can be understood as saying: About that which is written in the adjacent passage you shall say. The preceding passage discusses offerings that were slaughtered outside the Temple, so the liability for offering up outside the Temple mentioned in this verse is also referring to those offerings.

Rava objects to this: Is it written: And about them? ''And to them'' is written, and it means that the command should be relayed to Aaron, his sons, and the Jewish people, who are mentioned in the beginning of the passage. Rather, liability in this case is derived as the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The opening phrase: ''And to them you shall say,'' starts with the conjunction ''and'' to mix the passages of slaughtering outside the Temple and offering up outside the Temple, in order to teach that one is liable for the latter even after having done the former.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Liability in this case is derived through a verbal analogy between the reference to bringing stated with regard to slaughtering (see Leviticus 17:4), and the reference to bringing stated with regard to offering up (see Leviticus 17:9). The verbal analogy teaches that just as there, with regard to slaughtering, one is liable for offerings that are going to be burned outside the Temple, since one slaughtered them there, so too here, with regard to offering up, one is liable even for offerings that are unfit and so will be burned outside the Temple, having been slaughtered there.

Rav Beivai objects to these suggestions: But what about that which we learned in a mishna (Karetot 2a): There are thirty-six cases in the Torah for which one is liable to receive karet. The mishna enumerates all thirty-six, and offering up outside the Temple is counted as only one of them. According to these suggestions, there are thirty-seven, as there is one case of one who offers up an offering that was slaughtered inside the Temple, and the other case of one who offers up an offering that was slaughtered outside the Temple, which are considered two independent prohibitions. The Gemara concedes: This is difficult.

§ The Gemara considers the source for other prohibitions. And concerning that which we learned in a mishna (110a): One who sprinkles part of the blood of an offering, e.g., if he sprinkles one sprinkling instead of four, outside the Temple courtyard, is liable; from where do we derive this? The tanna derives it from that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to one who slaughters outside the Temple courtyard: ''Blood shall be imputed to that man, he has shed blood, and that man shall be cut off from among his people'' (Leviticus 17:4). This serves to include liability for one who sprinkles sacrificial blood outside the Temple courtyard; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: It is derived from the verse: ''Any man…that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice'' (Leviticus 17:8). The term ''or'' serves to include liability for one who sprinkles blood outside the Temple courtyard.

The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yishmael, what does he do with this term ''or'' in ''a burnt offering or sacrifice''? It serves to divide them into two independent cases, such that liability is incurred even if one offered up only one of them.

The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Akiva, from where does he derive the halakha to divide them into two cases? He derives it from the next verse: ''And he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting'' (Leviticus 17:9). The term ''it'' is written in the singular to indicate that one is liable even if he offered up only one of them.

And as for Rabbi Yishmael, why does he not derive that halakha from the term ''it''? The Gemara answers: According to him, that term is necessary as the source for the halakha that one is liable for offering up a complete animal, but one is not liable for offering up an incomplete animal. The term ''it'' indicates an animal in its entirety. And as for Rabbi Akiva, he derives this from the repetition of ''it'' in the continuation of the verse: ''He will not bring it…to sacrifice it to the Lord'' (Leviticus 17:9).

And as for Rabbi Yishmael, how does he explain the repetition of ''it''? He holds that each mention teaches about a different case: One is referring to offerings that are fit to be burned inside the Temple courtyard that became incomplete and were then offered up outside. And the other one is referring to offerings that are unfit and so will be burned outside the Temple as they were unlawfully slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, that became incomplete and were offered up outside. In both cases one is exempt. And so it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael says: One might have thought that with regard to offerings that were fit to be burned inside the Temple courtyard and that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside, one would be liable. To dispel this notion, the verse states: ''To sacrifice it,'' which indicates that for offering up a complete animal one is liable, but one is not liable for an incomplete animal.

And Rabbi Akiva, who has already expounded both mentions of ''it,'' disagrees with Rabbi Yishmael and holds that one is liable for offerings that are fit to be burned inside that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside.

Rabbi Yishmael derives the liability for sprinkling part of the blood of an offering outside the Temple courtyard from the verse ''Blood shall be imputed to that man.'' The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Akiva, what does he do with this verse: ''Blood shall be imputed to that man''? He expounds it to include liability for the slaughter of a bird offering outside the courtyard. One is liable despite the fact that inside the Temple, a bird is sacrificed by pinching the nape of its neck, not by slaughtering it. And as for Rabbi Yishmael, he derives this halakha from: ''Or that slaughters it outside the camp'' (Leviticus 17:3).

And Rabbi Akiva could have said to you that he does not derive it from that verse, as he holds that it is necessary to teach that only one who slaughters a bird offering outside is liable, but one is not liable for pinching its nape outside. And as for Rabbi Yishmael, from where does he derive that one is exempt if he pinches? He derives it from the phrase at the beginning of the passage about slaughtering outside: ''This is the matter'' (Leviticus 17:2), which indicates that one is liable only for slaughtering and not for any other method of killing.

Rabbi Yishmael’s opinion is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: ''Any man of the house of Israel that slaughters an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that slaughters it outside the camp'' (Leviticus 17:3). From this verse I have derived liability only for one who slaughters an animal offering outside; from where do we derive that one is liable if he slaughtered a bird offering outside? The verse states: ''Or that slaughters,'' to include liability for slaughtering a bird.

One might have thought that even one who pinches the nape of a bird offering outside would be liable. And there is a logical inference to support this: If with regard to the slaughter of a bird offering, which is not the valid method of preparation inside the Temple, one is nevertheless liable if he did it outside, then with regard to pinching the nape of a bird offering, which is the valid method of preparation inside the Temple, is it not logical that one is liable if he did it outside? To counter this, the verse states: ''This is the matter'' (Leviticus 17:2), which indicates one is liable only for slaughtering, not for any other method of killing.

And Rabbi Akiva could have said to you that he does not derive it from that verse, as he holds that it is necessary for expounding as part of a verbal analogy with the passage with regard to vows, where it is written: ''This is the matter that the Lord has commanded'' (Numbers 30:2).

§ The Gemara considers the source for other prohibitions. And concerning that which we learned in a mishna (112b): One who takes a handful from a meal offering outside the Temple courtyard but does not burn it, and one who collects the blood of an offering in a vessel outside the Temple courtyard but does not sprinkle it on an altar, he is exempt; from where do we derive this, that one is not liable unless he also completes the subsequent sacrificial rites? The Gemara is surprised by the question: But from where would it be derived that one is liable for these acts, necessitating a source for the fact that he is exempt?

The Gemara demonstrates that there is no reason to have assumed that one would be liable: If you suggest deriving it through a comparison to slaughtering outside the Temple, where one is liable even if he does not perform the subsequent sacrificial rites, this can be refuted: What is notable about slaughtering? It is notable in that with regard to a Paschal offering, if one slaughters it with the intent that it be for the sake of those who cannot eat it, it is thereby disqualified. The cases in the mishna do not share this stringency.

And if you suggest deriving it through a comparison to sprinkling blood outside the Temple, as one is liable for sprinkling the blood even though it is only one of the sacrificial rites of the offering that should have been performed inside the Temple, this can be refuted: What is notable about sprinkling? It is notable in that a non-priest who sprinkles blood in the Temple is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven for this act. The cases in the mishna do not share this stringency.